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E-mail address: wsujansky@sujansky.com (W.V. SuOnline personal health records (PHRs) enable patients to access, manage, and share certain of their own
health information electronically. This capability creates the need for precise access-controls mecha-
nisms that restrict the sharing of data to that intended by the patient. The authors describe the design
and implementation of an access-control mechanism for PHR repositories that is modeled on the eXten-
sible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) standard, but intended to reduce the cognitive and com-
putational complexity of XACML. The authors implemented the mechanism entirely in a relational
database system using ANSI-standard SQL statements. Based on a set of access-control rules encoded
as relational table rows, the mechanism determines via a single SQL query whether a user who accesses
patient data from a speciﬁc application is authorized to perform a requested operation on a speciﬁed data
object. Testing of this query on a moderately large database has demonstrated execution times consis-
tently below 100 ms. The authors include the details of the implementation, including algorithms, exam-
ples, and a test database as Supplementary materials.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Background
Online personal health record (PHR) systems allow individuals
to access, manage, and share certain of their healthcare informa-
tion electronically [1,2]. However, these capabilities also create
new requirements for data privacy and access control. Individuals
with online PHRs want and need the ability to specify with preci-
sion which users may access their health records, which parts of
their records the users may access, and what kinds of operations
the users may perform [3,4]. For example, an individual may wish
to specify the following set of access-control policies for her PHR:
 ‘‘Anyone whom I designate as a family member may view my med-
ication list, except for one of my medications that I’d rather not
share. . .”
 ‘‘Anyone whom I designate as a health care provider may view my
medication list and my history of ofﬁce visits and hospitalizations,
but not modify these data. . .”ll rights reserved.
2, San Carlos, CA 94070, USA.
jansky). ‘‘My primary physician, Dr. Albright, may view and modify my
medication list and may view and annotate my log of meals and
physical activities. . .”
 ‘‘Dr. Albright’s EHR system may automatically add new items to my
medication list, but it may not change or retrieve any items unless
Dr. Albright is logged in.”
The XACML standard (eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage) is an XML-based language for deﬁning complex and ﬁne-
grained access-control policies such as the examples above [5].
XACML deﬁnes a processing model in which a secure data resource
(such as a PHR system) consults a software service called a ‘‘Policy
Decision Point” (PDP) to determine whether the access requests it
receives are allowed. The PDP makes the determination based on
the characteristics of the requests and the access-control policies
deﬁned for the relevant data. The characteristics of a data-access
request (the ‘‘request attributes”) consist of (1) the subject (user),
(2) the requested data, (3) the requested operation, and (4) the
context of the request, such as the application submitting the re-
quest. Access-control policies in the XACML model specify the
combination(s) of request attributes that are allowed or prohibited.
XACML is a general purpose, ﬂexible, and very powerful lan-
guage for specifying and enforcing access-control preferences,
and several proprietary and open-source implementations now
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ber of trade-offs and limitations:
1. Complexity: Certain users of XACML have expressed that its
broad scope of purpose and high degree of conﬁgurability are
achieved at the cost of signiﬁcant complexity, both syntactic
and semantic [8]. For example, the XACML 1.0 standard speciﬁ-
cation is 130 pp long [5], and the Java API for one implementa-
tion of it contains over 150 object classes [9].
2. Runtime performance: Certain implementations of XACML have
exhibited runtime performance degradation, particularly as
the number of access-control policies (rules) grows large [6].
Given that a PHR data repository must perform an access-con-
trol check for every retrieval or update operation, such latencies
can quickly degrade overall PHR response time.
3. Lack of hierarchical attribute structures: The current versions of
XACML do not support the organization of request attributes
into logical ‘‘IS-A” hierarchies (for example, user roles or data
types). Such hierarchies are useful for streamlining the speciﬁ-
cation of access-control policies when the number of potential
attribute values and the relationships among these values grow
large [10].
We considered these trade-offs in the course of implementing
a PDP for the Project HealthDesign common platform components
[2]. During requirements analysis for these components, four of
the nine Project HealthDesign grantees expressed that the compo-
nents should provide ﬁne-grained access control to patient data.
These grantees planned to use the common platform to make pa-
tient data available to multiple applications, with the beneﬁt that
the data could be collected once and re-used for multiple pur-
poses. However, the grantees felt that patients were entitled to
rigorous oversight and control over how and with whom their
health data were shared, as well as how and by whom their data
were modiﬁed. The details of this business requirement were
solicited and documented as a set of speciﬁc functional require-
ments [11]. These requirements suggested a capability for ﬁne-
grained role-based access control that would be applied in real
time as patient data stored in the common platform were in-
serted and accessed by various applications and users. For exam-
ple, a patient may wish to include her entire medication list in
the common platform database to enable an online drug–drug
interaction checking application she uses and to enable her per-
sonal physician to review and update her medications. However,
the patient may wish to disclose only a subset of her medication
list to her diabetes case manager and her family members, who
are involved only in assisting her diabetes management. Although
the XACML model provides most of the features and expressive-
ness required for such ﬁne-grained control, we were concerned
that the complexity of the model would hinder its practical use
by the grantees and could result in unacceptable performance
overhead.
To beneﬁt from the features of XACML while avoiding its trade-
offs and limitations, we chose to implement our PDP based on a
simpliﬁed variation of the XACML model. The simpliﬁed model
(which we refer to as ‘‘PDP-RDBMS” within this paper) enabled
us to implement the access-control rules and adjudication logic
within a relational database and adjudicate a data-access request
by executing a single ANSI-compliant SQL query.Table 1
The set of request attributes for the insertion of a prescription record.
PatientID UserID OperationID Re
Pt-999 User-111 RecordInsert Pr2. Model
In the PDP-RDBMSmodel, each data-access request corresponds
to a vector consisting of the following request attributes:
 Patient: The patient whose data the requested operation per-
tains to.
 User: The user who is requesting the operation.
 Operation: The speciﬁc operation requested, such as create, read,
edit, delete.
 Resource: The data object and/or type of data object that the
request pertains to.
 Application context: The software application through which the
request is issued.
The values of Patient, User, and Application Context are unique
identiﬁers that correspond to real-world objects. The values of
Operation and Resource are tokens drawn from pre-deﬁned sets
of allowed data operations and existing data resources (the enu-
meration of these sets is not part of the PDP-RDBMS model, per
se, and may be modiﬁed or extended within speciﬁc
implementations).
As an example, if User-111 logs into Application-468 and
wishes to add a prescription to the PHR data repository for Pa-
tient-999, the request is modeled as the set of request attributes
shown in Table 1.
The access-control policies that determine whether such an
operation is allowed are represented as two types of objects: Role
Relationships and Access Rules.
2.1. Role Relationships
Role Relationships associate speciﬁc users with speciﬁc patients
and designate a speciﬁc role for the user in each such relationship.
Each valid role is represented by a unique RoleID, such as ‘‘Family-
Member,” ‘‘Physician,” or ‘‘RecordSubject” (the latter indicating
that the user is the patient). The schema for Role Relationships is:so
eschPatientIDiurceTypeID Resour
ription hnot yehUserIDiceID App
t assignedi ApphRoleIDiExamples of Role Relationships are:PatientID UserID RoleIDhPt-999i hUser-111i hSpousei
hPt-999i hUser-222i hChildi
hPt 888i hUser-222i hPhysicianiNote that users are assigned roles in the context of speciﬁc pa-
tient relationships, rather than as general attributes of their user
accounts (in contrast to traditional role-based access-control mod-
els [12]). This speciﬁcity, for example, allows patients to grant ac-
cess to their designated physician only, rather than to all users who
are physicians. The feature also allows individual users to have
different roles with respect to different patients (illustrated by
User-222 above). Lastly, RoleIDs are organized into a subsumption
hierarchy such that each descendant RoleID may inherit theContextID
-468
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hierarchy for the Project HealthDesign common platform imple-
mentation appears in the Supplementary materials.2.2. Access rules
Access Rules specify the policies that allow or prohibit various
data-access operations with respect to a speciﬁc patient record.
Each access rule is represented as a vector of the values shown
in Table 2.
PatientID and RoleID represent the patient and the user role to
which the access rule applies. Note that all access rules are speci-
ﬁed with respect to roles rather than individual users.
OperationID speciﬁes the allowed or prohibited operation that is
speciﬁed by the rule. These identiﬁers are pre-deﬁned within a
hierarchy of operations that is common to the data repository
and the PDP.
ResourceTypeID represents the semantic type of the resource to
which the access rule applies (such as ‘‘Prescription,” ‘‘SignOr-
Symptom,” or ‘‘PhysicalActivity”). These identiﬁers are pre-deﬁned
within a hierarchy of resource types that is common to the data
repository and the PDP.
ResourceID represents the speciﬁc data object to which the ac-
cess rule applies (if speciﬁed). Note that each access rule may spec-
ify either a ResourceTypeID or a ResourceID, but not both. For
example, one rule may permit access to all data of the type ‘‘Pre-
scription,” whereas a different rule may deny access to a speciﬁc
instance of Prescription if a patient wishes not to share it (the rule
for reconciling such conﬂicts is described below).
AppContextID represents the application from which the data-
access request is submitted. The value may designate the unique
ID of a speciﬁc application, indicating that the access rule pertains
only to requests originating from that application, or it may desig-
nate the special value ‘‘AllApps,” indicating that the access rule
pertains to requests from any application. The purpose of the Con-
textID is to allow rules that enable certain operations (such as up-
dates or deletes) to occur only via certain highly-trusted
applications. Context IDs may also be organized hierarchically,
rooted at the value ‘‘AllApps.”
Effect simply indicates whether the rule allows (‘‘Permit”) or
prohibits (‘‘Deny”) the speciﬁed operation.
Examples of Access Rules are shown in Table 3.
When adjudicating a data-access request, the PDP-RDBMSmod-
el always applies the following logic to determine whether the re-
quested operation is allowed:
The requested operation is ALLOWED if and only if:
(1) At least one combination of Role Relationship and Access
Rule exists that PERMITS the requested operation
AND
(2) No combination of Role Relationship and Access Rule exists
that DENIES the requested operationTable 2
The set of attributes that specify an access rule.
hPatientIDi hRoleIDi hOperationIDi hResourceTy
Table 3
Example access rules.
PatientID RoleID OperationID Resour
hPt-999i hFamilyMemberi hReadCurrenti hAllHea
hPt-999i hChildi hReadCurrenti hnulliBased on this logic, the example Role Relationships and Access
Rules above denote the following access policies for Patient 123’s
record:
Any user designated as a family member may read the current
value of any health data in Pt-123’s record, except that any user
designated as a child of the patient may not read the speciﬁc data
object ID-435.3. Implementation
We implemented the access policies and adjudication logic of
the PDP-RDBMS model as a MySQL database with a simple Java
programming interface.
3.1. Representing access-control policies
The database schema consisted of six tables. The Role Relation-
ships and Access Rules tables implemented the corresponding ob-
jects described above. The hierarchically organized value sets for
RoleIDs, OperationIDs, ResourceIDs, and ApplicationIDs were
implemented as materialized transitive closures [13] in the tables
RoleHierarchy, OperationHierarchy, ResourceTypeHierarchy, and Con-
textHierarchy. The schema for all of these hierarchy tables con-
sisted of the ﬁeldspeI
ceT
lthhAncestorIDiDi hResourceIDi hAppContextIDi
ypeID ResourceID AppContextID
Datai hnulli hAllAppsi
hID-435i hAllAppsihDescendantIDiThe representation of these hierarchies as materialized transitive
closures allows an SQL query to test for subsumption between a re-
quest attribute and the corresponding value in an access-control
policy via a simple (non-recursive) join. All ﬁelds within all of these
tables were indexed. The complete schema of the database appears
in the Supplementary materials.
3.2. Adjudicating an access request
When an application submits a data-access request to the PHR
data repository, the repository re-formulates the request as a vec-
tor of corresponding request attributes and submits the vector to
the Java interface for the MySQL database. The interface adjudi-
cates the request by passing the request attributes as parameters
to a SQL stored procedure that executes the adjudication logic.
The stored procedure consists of a single SQL query formulated
in standard ANSI SQL-92 syntax (see Fig. 1). The stored procedure
returns a record count that indicates whether the requested oper-
ation is permitted (record count > 0) or denied (record count = 0).
4. Performance
Although we have not conducted formal performance testing of
our PDP-RDBMS implementation, informal testing has shown con-
sistent response times of <100 ms for the execution of the query inhEffecti
Effect
hPermiti
hDenyi
Fig. 1. An SQL query that evaluates whether a requested operation (as deﬁned by a vector of request attributes) is permitted given the access-control policies speciﬁed in a set
of relational tables. Note that the boldfaced text strings delimited by ‘‘h i” are substituted with the corresponding request attributes at the time the query executes.
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Access Rules (see Supplementary materials). These tests were
conducted using the Microsoft Access 2003 database running on
a desktop computer with 512 MB of RAM and a single 2.4 GHz
Celeron processor.
5. Discussion
The PDP-RDBMS model by no means possesses the power or
ﬂexibility of the XACML standard. PDP-RDBMS provides only one
rubric for resolving inconsistent access rules, whereas the full
XACML standard allows the speciﬁcation of various algorithms.
Also, XACML is an industry standard based on XML, which confers
greater interoperability among distributed applications and web
services. Nevertheless, the PDP-RDMS model provides a useful
alternative to XACML when the full scope of the standard is not
needed or desired, when performance requirements preclude use
of access-control services that implement the full standard, and/
or when interoperability is less important.
The PDP-RDBMS model also has certain useful features that
XACML currently lacks, such as explicit support for the hierarchical
organization of request attributes and the ability to assign roles to
users in the context of speciﬁc patient records. Most importantly,
implementations of PDP-RDBMS can leverage the existing capabil-
ities of modern relational databases, such as sophisticated
indexing, compiled stored procedures, and query-optimization
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